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Saturday, July 22, 2017

Eyeball-to-eyeball in the Himalayas

Re-establishing Tibet’s geopolitical centrality in the trans-Himalayan region and breaking the special Bhutan-India bond is an important geopolitical goal for China in its competition with India in South Asia

 

 

It is difficult to figure out just what is happening in the ongoing face-off between India and China on the India-China-Bhutan tri-junction, or specifically the point where the three Himalayan regions — Sikkim, Tibet and Bhutan — meet.
The standoff has seen some uncharacteristic responses from the three actors. First, Beijing has adopted the posture of an aggrieved party and says it has issued a formal diplomatic protest to India. Second, discarding its normal reticence on these matters, Bhutan, through its ambassador in New Delhi, General V. Namgyel, has publicly called out China for constructing a road towards a Royal Bhutan Army camp, thereby violating a 1998 agreement in which both sides had agreed not to alter the status quo on their border.
Third, the usually voluble New Delhi has so far maintained a studied silence on the matter.
Problem is, Google Maps don’t quite show the places where the action is taking place. There is some confusion about where exactly the Doklam plateau, allegedly disputed between China and Bhutan, is located. Most maps show a 269 sq kms area to the north east of Yadong and some distance from the tri-junction. However, Chinese maps show the disputed area all the way down to the tri-junction.
This could well be the nub of the problem.
The Bhutanese believe the tri-junction is at a place called Dhoka La, where the so-called intrusion is believed to have taken place. The Chinese believe the tri-junction is located at a place called Gamochen, about 15 kms south of Dhoka La, and are building a road in this direction – which the Bhutanese are objecting to, saying Beijing is intruding into its territory. While India says the tri-junction is located at Batang La, about 6.5 km north of Gamochen.
The truth is that even 15- 20 kms on the ground brings the Chinese that much closer to a Bhutanese Valley; if the crow flies south of Gamochen, it would reach the sensitive Siliguri corridor, vital for India’s security.
However, none of these features are visible on publicly available maps and it requires an effort to locate them. Batang La seems to have the clearest claim to being the tri-junction, because of the flow of the river waters at that point.
The Chinese are not talking about a problem on the Sikkim-Tibet border; they allege that Indian forces crossed a mutually recognized border to block their road construction which, according to them, is “indisputably” Chinese territory.
It is clear why the Indian troops reacted. The goal of the Chinese action is to shift the India-China-Bhutan tri-junction south to Gamochen and though it is being done in the name of a road construction in Bhutan, it directly impacts on Indian security.
China has multiple motives in the region. First, it would like to promote the development of the Yadong region, which is connected to Lhasa with a highway and will soon get a branch of the China-Tibet railway from Shigatse. The Lhasa-Kalimpong route to Kolkata is one third shorter than the one via Kathmandu. This is linked to China’s aim of re-establishing Tibet’s geopolitical centrality in the trans-Himalayan region. Remember, that it also claims all of Arunachal Pradesh, south of the Himalayas.
Second, China would like to establish formal ties with Bhutan, set up an embassy in Thimphu and develop direct trade connections with it; so far Bhutan has fobbed off its advances. Breaking the special Bhutan-India bond would be an important geopolitical goal for China in its competition with India in South Asia.
Third, it would like to adopt a military posture in the area which will ensure that it can defeat India in any military contest. Given the strong Indian positions in Sikkim and adjacent areas, control of the Doklam plateau would allow China’s military to cut through Bhutan to the Siliguri corridor and if it pleased, to cut off India’s North-eastern states from the rest of the mainland.
To this end, China is following its characteristic tactics of changing goalposts in its negotiations with Bhutan, and mixing military coercion with diplomatic and economic inducements. At the same time it is seeking to check India’s efforts to help Bhutan.
Bhutan shares a 470 km border with China in the north. Since 1984, it has been in talks with the Chinese and has succeeded in reducing its disputed territory from 1128 sq kms to just 269 sq kms. This, however, was done by Bhutan voluntarily ceding territory, including Mount Kula Kangri. But China continues to maintain its claims over seven areas and is pushing the hardest in the Doka La area.
It has built a network or roads through the Chumbi Valley and is making lateral roads encroaching on Bhutanese positions whenever it feels the situation is opportune.
During the Bhutan-China talks in Beijing in 1996, China offered to trade 495 sq kms in the Pasamlung and Jakarlung valleys for the 269 km it claims in western Bhutan. There were reports that Bhutan had accepted the proposals, but the news proved to be incorrect. However, in 1998, the two sides signed an Agreement for the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity in the Bhutan-China Border Area. Article 3 of the treaty explicitly says that prior to the final solution of the problem, the two countries should maintain “the status quo of the boundary prior to March 1959.”
This, is what the Bhutanese say is being violated in China’s action in constructing a road in the Doklam region.
The 220 km border between Sikkim and Tibet is the only delimited and demarcated part of the 4,000 km odd Sino-Indian border. The rest is defined by a notional Line of Actual Control. This was an outcome of the Anglo-Chinese convention  of  1890 which defined the border as  the crest of the range separating the Teesta river flowing to India and the Mochu river waters flowing to Tibet.
Subsequently, it was  demarcated on the ground and marked by boundary pillars. It is true that over the years there have been issues with regard to the exact location of some of the pillars and there have been similar incidents in 2007 and 2014 during Chinese president Xi Jinping’s visit to India.
Even though the Chinese recognized the dealings of the British Empire with their Qing counterparts in the late 19th and early 20th century in relation to Tibet and Sikkim, they did not accept the integration of Sikkim into the Indian Union in 1975.
It was only in 2003, during Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s visit to Beijing that the two sides struck a deal. The Chinese agreed to recognize Sikkim as an Indian state, while India agreed to recognize the “Tibet Autonomous Region” as a part of China.  Even so, it took the reluctant Chinese another three years before they formally altered their maps to show Sikkim as being part of India and opened it up for cross-border trade.
And this is where the Chinese refusal to allow Indian pilgrims to go through Nathu La to Kailash Mansarovar comes in. Opening up Nathu La to traffic in 2006 was an important part of the effort to normalise Sino-Indian relations. This old route offers Lhasa the closest access to a port. Because Nathu La is on the only section of the border which is mutually recognised, the Chinese agreed to allow it for use by Kailash-Mansarovar pilgrims as an alternate to the tough route through Lipu Lekh.
By blocking the pilgrims, the Chinese are slowly, but clearly turning the clock back on Sino-Indian relations.
Indian Express Online June 30, 2017

After Modi-Trump Meet, India Must Proceed… But With Caution

Modi’s remarks aimed to put across an India that was ready to synchronise itself with the Trump administration’s goals, but the US president made it clear he wanted India to commit to “free and fair trade”.

 

India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi with US President Donald Trump. Credit: Reuters 

 Only time will tell if chemistry did indeed develop between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and US President Donald Trump but both played well for their audience and said the right things to each other.

Modi’s slightly awkward embrace following the Rose Garden press meet told another story of energetic Indian attempts to woo Trump, and the latter playing along, at least for the moment. That no questions were permitted following the statements made by the two leaders was notable. As a convention, at least two questions each are posed to the leaders from the press from India and the US. Both leaders like one-way interactions with the media and though it was the Indian side which nixed the proposal for questions, it’s quite possible there was an easy meeting of minds between Modi and Trump on this.
We do not know the tone and tenor of what the two leaders said to each other in their meetings through the day. There are two ways of making an assessment. One is from the formal remarks made by Trump and Modi at the presser and the other is through the joint statement adopted following the meetings. The short remarks, though scripted, do reveal something of the personality and priorities of the leaders.
Take Trump’s remarks “that India would have a true friend in the White House”. It recalled an identical formulation made when he attended a fundraiser by the Republican Hindu Coalition headed by Shalabh Kumar, a major donor to his campaign, in the final phase of the presidential elections last year.  In the Roae Garden on Monday, Trump was quite flattering on India – emphasising its “fastest growing economy” status and hyping its somewhat flawed GST experiment – and the meat in his statement was economic: How the US and India could partner growth, which, incidentally, echoed the subtitle of the joint statement ‘prosperity through growth’. But Trump said the goal was “to create a trading relationship that is fair and reciprocal,” making it clear that he expected India to remove trade barriers to the export of US goods to India and reduce the current trade deficit, which is around $30 billion against the US. His reference to the 100 Boeing aircraft ordered by SpiceJet and the ongoing negotiations for long-term LNG contracts brought to the surface what was otherwise in the subtext.


In contrast to two paragraphs on security issues, economic issues merited six. The lead issue was the commonly perceived threat of terrorism and the determination to destroy them and their “radical ideology”. Trump commended the trilateral Malabar exercises to be held in July and also thanked India for its role in Afghanistan. However, it was North Korea, and indirectly China, that was on the president’s mind when he thanked India for joining in the sanctions and noted that the issue had to be dealt with “and probably dealt with rapidly.”
Modi’s remarks were carefully structured and what was evident was his subtle flattery of Trump who was thanked repeatedly for interacting with him. Modi also referred to his “vast and successful experience in the business world”. His effort was to put across an India that was ready to synchronise itself with the Trump administration’s goals, be they economic or related to security.
He emphasised the mutuality of interests and trust between the two nations and noted that there was no contradiction between his ‘new vision’ of India and Trump’s efforts of ‘making America great again’, though there is an obvious issue in Trump wanting to bring manufacturing back to the US, and Modi’s desire to get India on to the manufacturing bandwagon. Whatever be the case, Modi said, “India’s development and its growing role at the international level are in the USA’s interest”.
If Trump emphasised the economic over the security aspects of the ties, Modi’s remarks tended to do the opposite. Terrorism, of course, was a major reference, though Modi carefully nuanced his usually harsh references to Pakistan. He spoke of fighting terrorism “by doing away with the safe shelters, sanctuaries and safe havens” and spoke of the common interest in stabilising Afghanistan and ensuring security there and strategic cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. He expressed his appreciation for the role the US had played in enhancing India’s defence capabilities.
On the other hand, the joint statement adopted by the two sides represents more of a consensual document, as well as one crafted by the officials of the two sides through negotiations. For this reason it is significant that for the first time the US has agreed to language which says “The leaders called on Pakistan to ensure that its territory is not used to launch terrorist attacks on other countries.”
Previous joint statements – 2016 or 2015 – had spoken of the need to bring the perpetrators of Mumbai and Pathankot to justice. The US probably indulged India a bit by declaring Syed Salahuddin, the leader of the Hizbul Mujahideen, a specially designated global terrorist. The 71-year-old leader meant something once upon a time, but today he is a has-been, important for his symbolic value as the leader of the Hizbul and the United Jihad Council.
Whatever happens in Pakistan in relation to Jammu and Kashmir and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir is run by the Pakistani intelligence services. Yet, we should not entirely discount the American decision that will have an effect on the morale of the Kashmiri militant movement. The US also took on board the Modi government’s pet scheme of pushing for an international convention on terrorism, even though it is unlikely to press too hard on the issue at the international level.
India also got its way in putting its critique of China’s One Belt One Road into the joint statement, though without referring to the project or China. The statement speaks of the need to promote connectivity “through the transparent development of infrastructure and the use of responsible debt financing practices, while ensuring respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity, the rule of law and environment and call on other nations in the region to adhere to these principles”. The Chinese are not likely to be amused.
Where the US got its payoff was on committing India to “increasing free and fair trade”. Earlier joint statements would have anodyne references “to bolstering economic ties” and so on, but the issue here has been bluntly put and it should not be doubted that it is India on the mat. So while being “engines of growth” building prosperity all around is one thing, the US is clear that it must be done “in a manner that advances the principles of free and fair trade” which require removal of non-tariff barriers (expediting regulatory processes), protecting intellectual property rights, market access for US agricultural products, manufactured goods and services.
This is a tall order and not easy to fulfill. But presumably the government knows what it is doing. In the Obama years, there was talk of a US-India global leadership on climate change, and cooperation in solar energy and clean energy finance. The current joint statement, on the other hand, does not shy away from seeking export of US hydrocarbon products albeit LNG and clean coal. The reference in the joint statement to a deal for six Westinghouse reactors means little in the light of the difficulties affecting the US company which is owned by the troubled Toshiba corporation.
The emphasis of the interaction was bilateral, a word mentioned several times by Modi in his press statement. So even though the two sides described themselves as “responsible stewards” of the Indo-Pacific region, committed to peace and stability there, there was no mention of the UN Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS), though it does speak of tenets outlined in the UN Charter. They spoke of “respecting” freedom of navigation and overflight in the region. In the 2015 Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia Pacific and the Indian Ocean Region, the two sides were committed “to ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight throughout the region, especially in the South China Sea.” In the 2016 joint statement, upholding UNCLOS and freedom of navigation was there but the reference to South China Sea was dropped.
There is a Ray Charles lyric based on an old adage “Sticks and stones may break my bones but talk don’t bother me”. Joint statements and public remarks in press meetings do have value in the relations between nations. But just how much they have in Trump’s America is moot. The president has not hesitated to go back on something he says or alter an established policy on whim.
All Modi and his officials can say for now is “so far, so good”. They have done well by their own measure. Pakistan has been condemned, the trajectory of relations with the US is largely intact, though question marks remain on the question of China. But the Trump disruption is just beginning and it can still come back to bite us, whether it is in the issue of trade or US relations with Iran.
The Wire June 27, 2017

Modi in America: Chemistry, not history

Indian and American officials have been burning the midnight oil to ensure a positive outcome of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s talks with US President Donald Trump today. They should be successful because, leaving aside relatively minor disputations, India remains an area where the new and difficult US President does not have strong views.
Yes, in pulling out of the Paris climate deal, he lumped us with other countries as freeloaders. He has complained about India — along with China, Japan and Mexico — taking away American jobs, but he has also declared his friendship with India and Modi, albeit at an Indian-American fundraiser last October.
Having roiled relations with Europe and causing dismay among allies in the Asia-Pacific by cosying up with China, Trump also needs to show the US can retain and strengthen important partnerships. So, there is the first White House dinner of the Administration, to show that US-Indian relations are indeed special.
But given a “what’s in it for me” incumbent in the White House, the tone of the conversation will be one where India will demonstrate the many ways it is of benefit to the US, rather than a country seeking an indulgence here or a favour there. It will pitch India as an indispensable partner of the US, both in countering China in the Asia-Pacific and in dealing with Islamic radicalism. Further, it will showcase itself as an important market for the US defence industry. The expected sale of 22 Guardian drones is being hyped, though they are primarily used by the US Coast Guard and Border Protection Service.




Trump and his aides will no doubt use the occasion to press India in an area in which we are not too comfortable: market access and removal of trade barriers. In a letter to Trump on the eve of the Modi visit, four powerful legislators have outlined the American case. This is an area close to Trump’s heart, since it affects American jobs and businesses. So, Modi may find the going a bit uncomfortable, but it would be surprising if he goes into the conversation without being prepared. There is a glaring clash of visions in Trump’s America First promise of restoring US primacy in manufacturing and Modi’s Make in India plan. There is also a trio of issu es — the H-1B visas, climate change and the attacks on foreigners, including Indians in the US — which may not come up in the discussions, but forms an overhang on them.
Trump has his obsessions, but so has Modi, and in recent times, one of them has been Pakistan. In almost every speech abroad, Modi has never ceased to denounce Pakistan either by name or indirectly, for supporting terrorism.
Inserting Pakistan into the counterterror and Islamic radicalism conversation will have to be a careful exercise and will most likely be woven into the narrative of the positive role India has played in stabilising Afghanistan in coordination with the US.
There are still many imponderables that go beyond the Trump-Modi meet or the binary India-US equation. These relate to Europe, East Asia or the Middle East where Trump-led disruptions could have serious consequences for India. A breakdown of the US-China relationship is as consequential as a possible condominium between them, a conflict with Iran would be devastating for India’s energy security and geopolitical goals. But today’s conversation is likely to be bilateral.
Good relations with the US are important for India. But New Delhi has lockeditself into a hostile relationship with China and Pakistan, losing significant room for manoeuvre. Modi may be a tad overinvested in Washington even though he claimed merely to have overcome the “hesitations of history”. India’s potential, both as a security actor and an economy, has kept the US engaged so far. But the Trump approach could be a demand to “show the colour of [our] money”.
If Trump had been a normal president, it would have been fairly easy to predict that, given the upward trajectory of Indo-US relations, this will be an important visit. But his tendency to take contrary stances, peremptorily overrule line departments and reveal policy stances through tweets makes prediction hazardous.
One thing seems clear, Trump actually gets along well with tough-guy leaders like Modi. Witness his attitude towards Russian President Vladimir Putin, Egyptian Abdel Fattah el-Sisi or Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, or for that matter, Xi Jinping. This could be the real prize of the visit. If he establishes good chemistry with Trump, the other details could always be filled in later.
Economic Times June 25, 2017

Saturday, July 08, 2017

When Modi meets Trump: Expectations are deliberately being kept low for US visit

No other foreign tour of Prime Minister Narendra Modi has generated the kind of interest that his upcoming visit to the US is doing. No doubt it has to do with the personality of the current occupant of the White House, the unpredictable President Donald Trump.
GoI is keeping its fingers crossed and working out offerings for the visit: a UAV deal topped, perhaps, by one to make F-16s. Expectations of getting something in return are being kept deliberately low. Tamashas like the Madison Square Garden event of 2014 are out; Trump’s allergy to immigrants and immigration is well known. Issues like H1-B visas, trade deficit and market access, and the fight against terror remain in the books, but none of them are game changers. Our political relations still remain at the somewhat hyperbolic and declaratory stage. So, the actual danger to India is suffering collateral damage as a result of Trump’s policies elsewhere.
They have already created a sense of uncertainty in east Asia and Europe though their consequences for India are marginal. But there is one disruption that can be disastrous for us and it appears Trump has been working hard at it. This is roiling the volatile Middle East.
This is the most important external region for India, way beyond the much hyped Indo-Pacific. Qatar provides us 65% of our natural gas, Saudi Arabia 19% of our oil, along with significant amounts from Iran, Kuwait and Iraq. UAE is our third largest trading partner. Chabahar in Iran helps us bypass the Pakistani blockade and the region is a fertile ground for our private and public sector companies. The truly loyal 7 million strong diaspora remits $35 billion every year.
Trump’s outreach to the Muslim world has become an embrace of Saudi Arabia, a country central to the rise of Islamic extremism. Emboldened by Trump’s effusive support and leavened by a $110 billion arms deal, the Saudis have since led a draconian embargo on Qatar, ironically, for supporting terrorism. Trump added salt to the wound by attacking Qatar for funding terrorism “at a very high level”. He seemed to be unaware that Qatar hosts the biggest US military base in the region, set up after the Saudis kicked out the US. In the process Turkey, a key Nato ally, has lined up with Qatar, along with Shia Iran.
In the last two weeks we have seen a bizarre situation where the US has signed a $12 billion deal to supply Qatar air force with F-15 fighters, and the US state department has backtracked on the president’s words and demanded that the Saudis and their allies come up with a credible justification of their embargo.
The bigger danger is from the Trump administration’s Iran policy which the Americans say is still evolving. Trump accused Tehran of spreading terrorism even as the country re-elected reformist Hassan Rouhani as president. Last week, secretary of state Rex Tillerson openly advocated regime change in Tehran. Iranians, whose nuclear deal has been certified by the state department, are doing much of the ground fighting against IS, an alleged target of the Trump administration.
So we have all the ingredients of a crisis, indeed a possible war, in a region of extreme importance to India. As the record shows, its prime mover appears to be President Trump and his inept administration.
Modi has invested as much in the Middle East as in moving to a higher plane in his relationship with the US. His visits to Riyadh, Dubai, Tehran and soon Tel Aviv, have sought to carefully, but decisively, enhance Indian interests without falling foul of the multiple fault lines of the region. He overcame the “hesitations of history” to sign up on a joint vision for Asia Pacific and the Indian Ocean with the US. But all this and more could go up in smoke if the Gulf goes up in flames, with a match lit by the president of the United States.
Times of India June 24, 2017

When Modi meets Trump - things will be a lot different

Next week, Prime Minister Narendra Modi will be in the US for his long anticipated meeting with President Donald Trump. Given the circumstances, expectations are low, but the visit will be important in defining Indo-US engagement in the Trump era.
Officials are saying this is a “get to know you” kind of visit minus the hoopla that surrounded Modi’s first visit to the US as PM in 2014. This will be Modi’s fifth and shortest bilateral visit to the US since he took office, he made another visit to attend the multilateral Nuclear Security Summit in March 2016.

Use of diaspora
Unlike China or Mexico, India was not in Trump’s cross-hairs prior to becoming President. In his campaign speeches, he did lump India, along with China, Japan, Mexico and others for “ripping off” the US and taking away American jobs. But later in October, a month before the election, he participated in a fund raiser organised by the Republican Hindu Coalition (RHC) funded by Shalabh Kumar, and in his keynote address he said, “India and Hindu community will have a true friend in the White House.”
During the current visit, Modi will avoid the kind of diaspora event he staged at New York’s Madison Garden. Given Trump’s allergy to immigration and immigrants, this could possibly provoke a negative reaction. The Modi team is well aware there are limits to using the diaspora to push Indian policy.
moditrump_061917122716.jpg 
Photo: DailyO

The first issue that Modi will seek to deal with is that of H1B visas. The US allocates 65,000 of these visas to allow US companies to bring highly specialised foreign workers and in 2016 more than two lakh Indians had applied. Related to this is the anti-out sourcing stand of the Trump Administration which could impact on the $150 billion per annum IT industry in India.
There is a fundamental clash of interests between a Trump programme of America First and Modi’s Make in India idea. The challenge is to find the middle ground and see whether the two sides can cut a deal towards mutual gain.

Islamic radicalism
The second issue is that of China. Since he became President, Trump has bewildered the world with his shifting stances. Perhaps the most dramatic has been the shift on China where through the campaign he attacked China, promising to get tough on it on a range of areas from trade to the South China Sea.
But as President he has shifted track. Concern over America’s China policy is important for India which has reached out to the US and even made significant commitments such as committing itself to a mutual basing agreement and signing up on a Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia Pacific and the Indian Ocean with a view of balancing China’s rising power.
Third, India would like to fit its Pakistan concerns relating to Pakistan within President Trump’s hardline views on Islamic radicalism. But the US attitude towards Islamic radicalism seems confined to the Arab world and the Sunni/Shia interface. This is related to India’s hope of closer cooperation with the US whose position on Afghanistan is still evolving.
India is waiting for a broader long term US strategy for stabilising Afghanistan. However, it is clear from the limited increase in trainers and advisers being undertaken by the Pentagon that the US will pursue some form of “reconciliation” which could involve negotiations with the Taliban and the good offices of Pakistan. This would not fit into the Indian calculus, and it remains to be seen whether New Delhi is willing to adjust its position to meet American goals.

Gulf approach
Fourth, there is the issue of the Middle East, the one area where US and Indian interests have never quite been aligned and where the Trump disruption is at work. From the point of view of interests, this is arguably the most important external region for India.
This is where it gets 60 per cent of its oil and gas and from where an estimated 7 million of its citizens send back remittances worth $35 billion (Rs 2,25,600 crore) annually. Trade with GCC countries is of the order of $138 billion (Rs 89,00,000 crore).
Here, the US hardline on Iran threatens to throw a spanner in the works of our policy which seeks to carefully balance ties between the Saudi Arabia, GCC, Iran and Israel. The experience so far is that in dealing with the Trump Administration, it is the President himself who matters. He does not hesitate to upend policies recommended by his Cabinet colleagues or go back on his own views.
For this reason, the key outcome will be in the chemistry that develops through the Modi-Trump dinner meeting. There is nothing to suggest that this could go awry, but then, with Trump, you never know.
Mail Today June 19, 2017

Between opportunities and challenges

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s recent visit to Europe and to Kazakhstan has taken  place at an important conjuncture in global geopolitics. The withdrawal of the US from the Paris Climate Accord and the tensions in its ties with its allies like Germany have made the global geopolitical situation very fluid. The recent election outcome in UK has only added to this fluidity. Countries like China see this as an opportunity to fill the vacuum. India cannot compete with China across the board, but it needs to sharply upgrade its game to ensure that it does not lose out in the world order that is emerging. In this context, joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation is a positive move which enables India to play from the front foot.

India’s SCO membership rests upon the support India received from Russia and that it why the  most important leg of Modi’s European visit was the two day visit to Russia which followed upon his visits to Spain and Germany. Thereafter, he went to France. Russia is no ordinary country, it has been one of India’s steadfast friends in the past 70 years. And considering that there are really no contentious issues between the two countries and actual congruence on issues like terrorism, relations with Afghanistan and Iran, this relationship promises to deliver more in the coming decades.
Statements and declarations in all four  countries pressed the usual buttons—support for India candidature to the UN Security Council, strong criticism of terrorism and the conclusion of negotiations on a Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism. These indicate that they are issues that are being pursued by India.

Then there are issues that Russia will not sign on such as  the support for the freedom of navigation and the UNCLOS, an oblique criticism of China and the South China Sea. Germany agreed to a general reference, while Spain took the step of agreeing with India that the South China sea issue needed to be resolved through peaceful means and avoidance of “unilateral actions that raise tensions.”

Spain and Germany are also important in the context of its recent accession to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR),   and the Wassenaar Arrangement, NSG and Australia Group which it is seeking to join.  All three countries are supportive on India on these issues.
But Russian views on Pakistan are nuanced.  While it is a strong friend of India and has strongly condemned terrorism, it has not endorsed India’s tough stand on Pakistan. In an interview with PTI, President Putin said that the assessment of whether Pakistan is fuelling terrorism is “up to you [India]” and added that Pakistan was taking “immense steps to stabilize the situation in the[ir] country.”

Visits to Russia usually have practical outcomes. And so it was with the present visit which led to the two countries to sign an agreement to build two new reactors in Kudankulam and a loan of $ 4.2 billion to build them. In his interview with PTI Putin referred to “deep cooperation in delicate areas such as missiles,” something Russia has with no other country. He noted that Indo-Russian defence cooperation is at an “unprecedented level in its volume and quality.” Hopefully the visit would have given a push to stalled projects such as the manufacture in India of the Kamov 226T helicopter and  the fifth generation fighter. India’s ongoing cooperation on the second nuclear propelled submarine and the extended range Brahmos are of great strategic importance.

Despite all the political hype surrounding the visit, the fact is that India’s economic engagement with all three countries is below par. India total trade with Germany is just Euro 18 billion and its FDI in India is just about Euro 1 billion and India’s investment in Germany ae around Euro 7 billion.  Trade with Spain is just about $ 5 billion, though surprisingly, Spain’s FDI in India at $ 2.32 billion, though low, is double that of Germany’s. Indo-French trade was Euro 8.58 billion in 2016, French investments in India are around Euro 6 billion and India’s investment there is Euro 188 million.

The biggest underperformance in economic ties is with our friend Russia. Total trade last year was just $ 7.71 billion which was actually a decline of 1.5 per cent over 2015. Russian investments in India are of the order of $ 16 billion and Indian investments in Russia are about $ 13 billion, mainly in the energy sector. Of course, this does not take into account the money spent by India in buying defence equipment and spares.

One big problem India has with Germany and Russia is the lack of a free trade agreement. Talks with Germany on an FTA stalled in 2013 after 16 rounds  and since then bilateral treaties with Germany and other European countries have also lapsed. FTA talks with the Eurasian Economic Union anchored by Russia are yet to get underway. There is an impression among many countries that India is a difficult country to deal with on trade issues.

When looking at our ties with these European countries it would be useful to compare them with those of China. In 2016, German trade with China was of the order of Euro 170 billion, making it Germany’s most important trade partner. Total German FDI in China is around Euro 50 billion, Chinese investment is around Euro 18.5 billion. Bilateral trade between China and Russia is of the order of $ 69.5 billion in 2016 and is growing rapidly. China’s investment in Russia is around $ 40  billion and growing. China has ben on a buying spree in Europe, acquiring companies with a view of enhancing its own capabilities. They have bought companies dealing with robotics, telecom, aviation, energy, fashion and entertainment.

Beyond these figures are the trends over the horizon. China’s OBOR project aimed at consolidating ties with Europe and all three countries that Modi visited play an important role here. This year,  2000 or so trains will go from cities in China to European destinations like Madrid, Duisberg in Germany. Most of them travel through the Russian railway system. China is also developing maritime linkages via the Mediterranean into the heart of rich Europe. China’s strategy of Eurasian consolidation is closely linked to its aim of becoming a developed country by 2050 and it is systematically working towards it.

There are many opportunities for India through its close political ties with Russia and Germany. One of these is the International North South Transportation Corridor (INSTC), a multi-modal transportation project that will ferry  containers from Indian ports like Kandla and Mumbai to Russia and Europe via Iran. So far little has been done to promote the scheme, except to test its feasibility. Likewise it needs to speed up the linkages to Central Asia through Chah Bahar.

It is not surprising therefore that in Astana, Modi played a low key game. After all this was the first meeting India was attending as a full member. Nevertheless, he did make it a point to tell the audience, which included Nawaz Sharif and Xi Jinping, that India strongly  supported connectivity projects, but wanted them to take into account issues of sovereignty and territorial integrity. Perhaps India’s membership in SCO could provide the answer to the challenging issues that divide New Delhi, Islamabad and Beijing.
Greater Kashmir June 14, 2017