Chakravyuh we made: India needs a more realistic assessment of its Pakistan and China options

The country’s foreign and security policy has plunged into a Chakravyuh of its own making. Its major manifestation is the dead end that we have reached in our relations with China and Pakistan, our two principal neighbours, who are simultaneously our principal adversaries and each other’s best friends.
The biggest foreign and security policy challenge that we confront is the deepening China-Pakistan relationship. These are countries we have warred and skirmished with, and on their account we have to spend a fortune on our security apparatus.
Faced with this challenge, one would imagine that the principal aim of our government would be to seek to break this nexus, which has been around since the 1960s, by fair means or foul. Instead, however, we have been witnessing a strengthening of that alliance, especially in the last two years. As for the government, it is in a world of its own where it already believes that it is a major world power that can bring its adversaries to heel through a policy of unrelenting toughness.
In the real world, the choices for India are fairly clear – manage ties with the countries in question or engineer change in them. Changing China or Pakistan is too big a task for India to attempt alone. Even the mighty US has tried and failed. Hoping for change to come is a non-option, what is needed is a policy to manage the bilateral problems through dialogue and negotiation in the short term and effecting change with the help of other likeminded countries in the longer. In essence this is what India’s policy has been till recently. And it has achieved a great deal by avoiding a major war with either country, despite our very serious issues with them.
India rightly believes that the forces against change in Pakistan are powerful and insidious, but it is still worth pursuing the path of dialogue and friendship. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s approach towards Pakistan, at least to the point, a little over a year ago, when he descended on Lahore to wish Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif “Happy Birthday”, was in line with this.
It’s not clear what happened thereafter and the same Modi has since spoken of the need to sanction and isolate Islamabad in virtually every international forum that he addressed. It cannot simply be the cross-border attacks which are fairly minor and had been going on since, at least, 2012. We can only assume that Modi’s desire to make peace with Pakistan has been overtaken by his need to win the UP election and thereafter the general election; in both cases, bashing Pakistan and, by inference, Islamism, plays well with his electorate, as against the risk of endangering his political capital through instances such as the Pathankot and Uri attacks.
New Delhi has displayed the same zig-zag pattern with China. In his visit to Beijing in 2015, Modi made an impassioned plea to his counterparts to resolve the border issue. But since then, New Delhi has adopted a strident and sometimes belligerent attitude towards Beijing on issues that can, at best, be considered trivial – India’s membership to the NSG and placing Masood Azhar in the UN’s 1267 list. The former appears to be born out of a sense of entitlement, rather than a real need. As for the latter, counterterrorism is better off focussing on eliminating the terrorist, not putting him on some list. Hafiz Saeed has been on that list since 2008 and it has hardly made any difference to him or the Lashkar-e-Taiba.
A third issue relates to CPEC which India says it will not condone because it passes through Gilgit-Baltistan. On the face of it, it looks reasonable, but in essence it means that New Delhi is offering Beijing a Hobson’s choice – either accept India’s claim on J&K or abandon Pakistan. And it is not about to do either, at least not without good cause.
Defeating the Chakravyuh is not easy, false choices and illusions block the way, and the belief that only unrelenting toughness will work with Islamabad and Beijing. Getting out requires a more realistic assessment of India’s options and a willingness to accept the international norm that in bilateral ties, you are expected to give something in exchange for something you want. There are incentives New Delhi could offer – contracts for Chinese companies, a face-saving role for Pakistan in Kashmir and so on. At present all that is on display are disincentives for them. As of now, it would seem that New Delhi is riding on the hubristic belief that friendship with Washington is its key out of the maze. But in the US of today nothing will come for free.
Times of India March 4, 2017

Is it mere wishful thinking – or time to say Khuda Hafiz to Hafiz Saeed?

A number of Indian news sites carried a Press Trust of India report on February 21 stating that Pakistan had cancelled the licences of 44 weapons issued to the co-founder of Lashkar-e-Taiba and the chief of Jama’at-ud-Da’wah Hafiz Muhammad Saeed and other members of his organisations.

The PTI report cited a Punjab (Pakistan) home department notification as having cancelled the licenses for security reasons and mentioned action being taken against two of Saeed’s organisations, the Jamaat-ud-Dawa and the Falah-e-Insaniat Foundation.
The strange thing was that none of the major Pakistani papers like the Dawn or the Express Tribune have reported the licence ban, neither can it be found on the Pakistan Punjab government website.
So the news can either be taken with a pinch of salt, or, it could be assumed that the Pakistani authorities have indeed acted as the PTI report indicates, but are being discreet about the decision which, if true, would have shaken Saeed.
The Lashkar-e-Taiba founder has long believed in ensuring his own security. But if the guns have been taken away, he must be feeling quite vulnerable, unless the authorities have stepped in with their own security which they would, in any case, have to provide, if indeed it is true that he is under house arrest.
The cancellation of licences report comes on the heels of the Pakistan Punjab government’s decision to put Saeed and four of his colleagues under house arrest in Lahore for a period of 90 days on January 30. In addition, the jihadi leader and many of his associates belonging to the Jamaat-ud-Dawa and the Falah-e-Insaniat Foundation have been put on the Exit Control List barring them from leaving Pakistan.
There had been a bit of a stir when Pakistan’s defence minister Khwaja Asif declared at the Munich Security Conference earlier this week that “Saeed could pose a serious threat to the society” and had hence been placed under house arrest in the country’s “larger interest”.
Saeed’s arrest provoked the predictable uproar from the Difa-e-Pakistan Council, a grouping of religious extremists of which he is a vice president. But the action under the fourth schedule of the country’s Anti Terrorist act very clearly signaled an acknowledgement of his being linked to terrorism in some way.

Beyond tokenism?

There has been a great deal of speculation as to the Pakistani action. Some say that it is token action to assuage the Pakistani public opinion which has been shaken by a spate of eight terror attacks this month killing more than 100 people. The latest attack on one of the leading Sufi shrines at Sehwan has shaken the entire country.
Others speculate that anticipating a tough United States administration under new President Donald Trump, Pakistan is trimming its sails in advance. Asif, in his Munich speech, claimed that Pakistan was in the frontline of countries fighting terrorism and even criticised the West for its alleged isolationist policies.
The statement by Pakistan Army Spokesman Major General Asif Ghafoor that the decision was taken in “national interest” indicates that the government’s goals are quite narrow. There is speculation that the Pakistan Army, which has a new chief, is concerned about the spread of Jama’at-ud-Da’wah activities to other countries. Perhaps equally important is the growing influence of the outfit in Pakistan itself. The Jama’at-ud-Da’wah and the Falah-e-Insaniat Foundation run efficient social service networks, and Saeed has been trying to stoke Punjabi nationalism to expand his political footprint.
There is even a strand of opinion suggesting that the Chinese may be tiring of the opprobrium they have to face in supporting Pakistan’s favourite terrorists. However, the Chinese have more fish to fry in the region than pressure Pakistan on Saeed. Apart from the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, they have to worry about stabilising northern Pakistan, which includes a portion of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, to prevent the jihadi virus escaping north to Xinjiang. Second, they have an interest in stabilising Afghanistan to part their larger central Asian policy and insulate Xinjiang from the jihadi virus, in particular the Islamic State, given that scores of Uighyur fighters are believed to be fighting alongside the IS in Syria and Iraq.
As far as India is considered, it is watching on with bemused interest. It, of course, has great interest in what Saeed does and what happens to him. Unfortunately, it has been unable to actually lay his hands on him and try him for the murder of 166 persons in Mumbai on November 26, 2008 and other acts of the Lashkar-e-Taiba. So it is dependent on Pakistani actions. And those actions have not been particularly heartening.

Farcical arrests

Saeed has been detained before. He was arrested in December 2001, following the uproar over the attack on the Indian Parliament House, but he was released in March 2002 when the Indian military pressure abated. He was arrested again in May and released in October, and then placed under house arrest for a short while. Again, after the Mumbai train blasts, he was arrested in August 2006 but released in October.
Saeed’s defence was that while Lashkar-e-Taiba was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation in December 2001 by the United States and banned in Pakistan on January 12, 2002, there was no such ban on the JuD, which was formed after the ban on the Lashkar.
In December 2008, Saeed was again placed under house arrest after the United Nations put the Jama’at-ud-Da’wah in what is called its 1267 list – declaring it a terrorist organisation. The United States had also earlier designated it as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation in April 2008. This time he got his release through a Lahore High Court order deeming his detention unconstitutional in June 2009. Because of Indian pressure he was again detained in September, but the following month, the Lahore High Court quashed all cases against him and declared that the JuD was not a banned organisation in Pakistan and he could work freely in the country.
With this history, it is easy not to be sceptical. India has also seen how the parallel process of trying four top Lashkar-e-Taiba leaders including its operations chief, Zaki ur Rehman Lakhvi, is going nowhere.
Yet, if the cancellation of the arms licences report is indeed true, there does appear to be a new development. Because the one thing that Hafiz Saeed will worry about will be the possibility of getting picked up by Indian or American intelligence agencies and having to face the music for his malign past.
Scroll.in February 23, 2017

The Army Chief Would Do Well to Weigh His Words More Carefully

General Bipin Rawat may be right to warn those who try to obstruct anti-militancy operations, but labelling separatism and militancy with terrorism is not the solution.

Army chief General Bipin Rawat. Credit: PTI

The new army chief, General Bipin Rawat, must be learning just how important it is to weigh one’s words when in the hot seat. His remarks, made no doubt in anger, that the army would treat all those in Kashmir who do not support army operations or obstruct them during encounters “as overground workers of terrorists,” are clearly over the top and probably do not meet the legal standard – especially his belief that displaying ISIS and Pakistani flags is tantamount to terrorism.
His threat of “tough action” against protestors raises more questions than it answers. Because in army parlance, tough action could imply a shoot-to-kill policy. No self-respecting army can turn its guns on unarmed protestors, even if they are throwing stones; their job is to take on armed militants and leave civilian protestors to the police.
Minister of state for home Kiren Rijiju’s defence of Rawat – that action could be taken against anyone who “works against national interest as national interest is supreme” – is simply fatuous. No ‘national interest’ can justify gunning down unarmed protestors. Besides being characterised as a war crime, such action would actually be anti-national.
The chief is clearly frustrated at the high casualties the army is suffering in the Valley in recent times. However, there are two specific reasons for this. First, in winter months, the security forces usually launch an across-the-board offensive in the Valley to catch militants who are compelled by the weather to abandon their forest retreats. Second, the government and the security forces have boxed themselves into a situation where counter-insurgency has been stripped of its crucial “hearts and minds” element and the only instrument being used to resolve the Kashmir issue is the proverbial ‘danda‘, or stick.
First and foremost, it is important for everyone to have their definitions right. Stone pelting is violence, but it is not the same thing as armed militancy. The latter can only be fought with the gun, while the former must be tackled in a different manner, most certainly not by shooting pelters. Second, all anti-government militants in Kashmir are not terrorists. Only those who deliberately target civilians can be put in that category.
Looking back at events in Kashmir since last July, the security forces cannot be blamed for going after Burhan Wani since he was a self-professed militant and lived by the code of kill or be killed. At the same time, it is wrong to dub him a “terrorist”. To the best of our knowledge, Wani and his fellow militants have not deliberately targeted non-combatants. Seeking to undermine Kashmiri separatism by describing it as “terrorist” is not likely to work, and it is also not accurate, and will only result in faulty responses.
By deliberately creating obfuscation on this issue, the government is making things difficult for itself. No self-respecting government – not this one or any other – can negotiate with terrorists. But such governments can and do negotiate with militants. The Doval negotiations with the NSCN(I-M) is a recent example. During the first NDA government led by Atal Bihari Vajpayee, the government sent the Union home secretary to meet with masked militants in Srinagar.

Public attitude a cause for concern
The crossover of violent civil protest into violent armed militancy is not a good sign. General Rawat is right to warn those who try to obstruct anti-militancy operations. This is sometimes done in a very risky fashion where crowds gather and launch protests near an ongoing shoot out. The protestors at the site of an ongoing anti-militancy operations are deliberately seeking to obstruct a military operation through an act of brinkmanship which could go horribly wrong if a grenade or AK-47 burst goes the wrong way in the tense environment.
Perhaps the army and the civil authorities need to work on new strategies of dealing with such situations. But the problem is that at present, many of the militants being killed are Kashmiris and their relatives and friends live nearby and are agitated when they get killed.
On the other hand, the Modi government’s style raises a few questions. It has adopted a uni-dimensional policy of hitting hard at the militancy, without seeking any political means to undermine the support the militants’ cause has generated. Many so-called counter-insurgency experts in India look admiringly at Israeli methods, but the Indian and Israeli situations are as different as chalk and cheese.
For one, the Israelis are dealing with a conquered population and that, too, not too well, considering their retreat from Gaza. The repeated cycles of Israeli military operations have degenerated into an armed stand-off with no resolution in sight since Tel Aviv refuses to conduct any political negotiations.
The other method of dealing with an insurgency is the Sri Lankan approach – using a scorched earth policy resulting in a horrific toll of non-combatants and tens of thousands of displaced persons. The Pakistanis also hew close to this style, though they first ensured that all civilians had left the areas which they subsequently attacked with gunships and artillery.
Militancy in the Valley has never been anywhere as bad as things have been in Waziristan or in Sri Lanka. Today, the militants are few in number, and they are armed with AK-47s and grenades. To use Israeli or Sri Lankan means would be to use the proverbial hammer to kill a fly, with horrific consequences.
The real challenge is to maintain pressure on the militants, even while undermining their cause through political means. This requires sophistication and patience. Sadly, there is little of that in display in the Modi government’s approach. The result is that the clock is steadily being turned back to the 1997-2004 period when security forces routinely lost hundreds of personnel every year, peaking in 2000 when 638 died. In contrast, from 2007 onwards, the numbers fell below 100, dipping to just 17 in 2012.
The authorities need to ask themselves why the civilian support to militancy in Kashmir has risen in the past two years and why the people there risk crowding encounter sites even while the shooting is going on. Government ministers have said Pakistan is paying people to pelt stones, but it is unlikely that you could pay an unarmed crowd to push against the army where bullets are flying. The government needs to reflect on this situation, and also worry about the possibility of an incident in which a large number of unarmed protestors get shot – something that hasn’t happened since the Bijbehara incident of 1993 and which would be a blot on India’s reputation.
The Wire February 17, 2017

Book Review: Dragon on our Doorstep

Dragon on Our Doorstep: Managing China Through Military Power is a vast book covering virtually every aspect of India’s defence policy, from 1947 to the present. It examines issues as diverse as China’s grand strategy, the demolition of Babri Masjid, to building military power and the succession of the Dalai Lama. But its focus is quite clear, managing India’s real security problem – the rise of China.
Given the enormous asymmetry that has already developed in the comprehensive national power of China and India, there is no resolution that is possible, the issue can only be managed and the authors suggest that to even begin that process, India must set its defence system right. This is not, as its name may imply, a hawkish call to arms, but a sober analysis which argues that military power is an important part of the mix of any country’s geopolitical perspective. But India has diluted this ingredient, has suffered the consequences and will continue to do so till it changes its approach. So, it is critical of those who speak blithely of a two-front war with China and Pakistan, arguing that even a one-front war was not an option. What it advocates is an effective military capacity as a precondition of building durable peace with Pakistan and China.

Pravin Sawhney and Ghazala Wahab,
Dragon on Our Doorstep: Managing China Through Military Power
Aleph, 2017

This is a provocative book and deliberately so, aimed at shaking Indian complacency. As the editors of Force magazine, the authors have traveled across the country, visited numerous facilities and units, and spoken and interacted with a large number of military officers in key positions. A great deal of this is evident in the material that has been marshalled in the book, as well as in the assertions that they make in the book. You may or may not agree with all of them, but they definitely provoke thought.
Over the years, political leaders, bureaucrats and even military leaders have begun to work with the assumption that no external force can dare to attack India, not just because we have nuclear weapons now, but that we are so big and populous that it would be a foolhardy enterprise.
They may not have understood the character of defeat. More often than not, it is a state of mind – within two weeks of the German offensive in 1940,  with Paris and most of France still to be conquered, the French  government threw in the towel and accepted defeat. This  was not very different from  November 1962, when a broken Pandit Nehru wrote off Assam and appealed to the US for military assistance, or the slow defeat of the US in Vietnam between 1968 and 1975.
At the root of India’s problems, the authors write, is the erroneous belief that a large and well equipped military alone can win wars. Given the fact that wars are an  extension of politics, the one thing that India has not been able to get is its politicians to understand this. Not only do politicians tend to shun things military, but they also systematically exclude the military from higher defence management.
Carl von Clausewitz is well known for his observation that, “war is nothing by the continuation of policy with other means” – in other words, without political ends, war is  meaningless. And repeatedly, as the authors show in India’s case, those political ends have not been  clear – the most recent being the 2002 Operation Parakaram. If fighting must have a political purpose, surely it behoves those who are involved to closely integrate the political and military  means. It is not just a question of political ends, but the necessity of the political leader to control every aspect of war – its intensity, its direction and length etc.

Ghazala Wahab. Credit: Twitter

Given this, it is vital for the politicians to have a grasp of military affairs, or, at least, clearly understand what the military is all about. Of course, it goes without saying that military leaders, too, need to understand national policy. So while the politics must always be in command, the military must be in a position to influence the leader. But the leader and his political ilk must make it a point to understand why their country is spending a vast fortune in buying guns, tanks, maintaining millions of men in arms. They cannot depute this function to the civilian bureaucracy as they have done till now, to the detriment of the security of the nation. Only the political leader can take decisions that may simultaneously span diplomacy, trade, military operations and politics.
In some ways, for example, the success of the Allies in World War Two arose from the ability of an arch imperialist (Winston Churchill), a half democrat (Franklin D. Roosevelt) and a dictator (Stalin) to work together towards a common goal. They coordinated their diplomatic strategy, military offensives, military assistance while their adversaries were an axis only in name, with little coordination and diplomacy.
India’s official defence budget is now over Rs 3,59,000 crore, including pensions. If you add the nuclear and space activities it is even greater. It is vastly more than what we spend for health, social welfare and infrastructure.
Surely, this would mean that the politicians in-charge would take the task of purposefully spending this money, managing the men and ensuring that the country gets the best bang for the buck. But, as we know, this is far from the case. Indeed, the country’s defence system is seriously dysfunctional, making it unfit for a major war as became evident when the challenge came – following the terrorist attack on parliament in 2001 and the Mumbai attack of 2008. By their own reckoning, the modernisation of the three wings of the armed forces is delayed by at least a decade. There is no point trying to blame a single minister or government – the problems are systemic. Efforts have been made by expert committees and even the standing committee on defence in the parliament to recommend change, but the government has been firmly proof against any advice.

Pravin Sawhney. Credit: Twitter

Things have not changed much with the Narendra Modi government. The authors note that the ambitious ‘Act East Think West’ slogan raised by the government has no place for military power in its planning. In their view, “thinking strategically and developing an appreciation of military power are two major shortcomings of India’s foreign policy.”
This foreign policy weakness is compounded by the fact that India does not have a defence policy either. For the past decade a small group of strategic specialists have been trying to push the government to adopt a strategic defence review, duly approved by the cabinet committee on security, to outline India’s priorities in the area of defence and provide  a coherent narrative as to how it plans to cope with the challenges. The main aim of this is to ensure that the entire governmental system is on the same page when it comes to the vital area of defence. Though documents have been drafted by the National Security Advisory Board, the governments of the day have not seen it fit to study, let alone accept or reject them.
This is an impressive piece of work and beyond the actual recommendations, there is a wealth of information that an interested reader can gather about the way India’s defence system works (or doesn’t).
The Wire February 13, 2017

Hammer Of Authority:The Indian military is its own police and judge. That’s the problem.

One  way to understand our current military justice system is to read the sections in the Army Act of 1950 dealing with “offences in relation to the enemy and punishable with death” relating to warlike situations. Samples: “shamefully” abandoning a garrison or a defence position, casting away arms, cowardice, assisting the enemy, putting up the white flag of surrender, spreading rumours that may create alarm, a sentry who “sleeps upon his post or is intoxicated” in times of war.
Independent India has got no soldier execu­ted; that does not mean we have not had cowardice or desertion in times of war, or sentries who fell asleep. All it does is to tell us how antiquated the law is. The colonial ring of its language, and some provisions, date many of its provisions to the 1911 Indian Army Act.

There is something inherently authoritarian about the military justice system because the military is a kind of dictatorship functioning within a democracy. Given the requirements of military discipline and the preservation of good order, the system has felt a need to create an authoritarian regime where authority flows from the top to the bottom. Also, questioning an order, or not following the draconian rules, can lead to punishment that would be considered severe by the regular laws of the country.
Good order and discipline are not just about war time, but relate to the daily life of an army man requ­ired to keep the military’s fighting edge keen at all times. For this, there are summary procedures for commanding officers of units to punish jawans up to the rank of a hawaldar. Death sentence may not visit you if you desert, mutiny, steal, strike or threaten superiors in peace time, but you can still get 14 years RI and be cashiered, which means no retirement benefits.
There are other problematic provisions, such as “unbecoming” or “disgraceful conduct” of officers and junior commissioned officers, not too clearly defined, but venture into areas that go against the moral ethos of the armed forces and their sense of honour. Actually, unlike the police or other state instruments, army personnel can be punished for cruelty to civilians, defiling religious places and even infidelity.
 The aim of the system is to provide a quick, but fair procedure. Safeguards are built in, but the very nature of the system raises questions. The military courts, or the courts martial, comprise benches of five or three officers with no legal training—even the prosecutor and defence councils are line officers. General courts martial usually have a judge advocate who is supposed to advise the court on the finer points of the law.
 In essence, the military is its own police, forensic dep­artment, judge and jury, and this is the biggest weakness of the system. While the summary court-martial is a useful means of maintaining good order, when it comes to more serious crimes, collecting evidence, its presentation and consideration by a non-specialist group can be problematic. The idea that peers are the best judges goes back to the European notion of a jury trial. In India, the system was abolished after a jury acquitted a naval commander of a 1959 murder of a businessman. The Bombay High Court overturned the verdict and tried and convicted him through a bench.

Over time, the infirmities of the system have been app­arent, especially since it has no built-in right to appeal and, given its draconian nature, bears instances of its misuse. To deal with this, the government established the Armed Forces Tribunals (AFTs) in 2007. The members here are mixed—senior retired judges and senior retired military officers.
The big problem, however, is that the AFTs come under the ministry of defence, instead of the law ministry. So the appeals system is run by the very outfit against whom the appeals are usually entered. The key powers to have their judgements and orders impl­emented have been withheld from the Tribunals, and their rulings are simply ignored, if found inconvenient.
Separating the military from society has often been seen as a means of enhancing the military effectiveness of the forces. The Army Act was a manifestation of this. But times have changed, and so have the very nature of warfare and the context of the old rules. Getting soldiers to follow orders must be accompanied by a culture where not only illegal orders are challenged, but instead draconian discipline to get them to follow orders, the officers depend on their self-esteem as professionals and their sense of being part of a team.
 There are reports saying the government intends to provide the legal teeth to the tribunals. The MoD and the three services are not very happy about this, but the time has come to bring the military justice system in line with the mores of contemporary society.
Outlook February 17, 2017

In an America First world, pursuing an India First policy is the logical response

The Trump disruption is now in full flow and the tectonic plates are shifting under our feet. The fault lines run along the issues of trade, immigration, relations with China and Iran.
In Trump’s America First world, there are no friends and enemies. Trusted friends and allies have been given short shrift as the new President has taken the US out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). How little the US bothers about loyalty is evident from Donald Trump’s testy conversation with Australia’s Prime Minister Malcom Turnbull last week. Trump’s bullying behaviour towards Mexico indicates that he cares even less about good neighbourliness.
At first sight, India has little to worry. Prime Minister Narendra Modi says that his conversation with Trump was “warm” and that he had invited the US President to visit India. The two leaders had “discussed security in the region of South and Central Asia” and resolved that the two countries “stand shoulder to shoulder in the global fight against terrorism”. But parsing the sentence could well suggest that the US may want Indian boots on the ground in the quagmire of Afghanistan. Note there is no reference to the flavour of yesterday – the Asia-Pacific aka the Indo-Pacific.
There are actually just two ways of dealing with Trump: Go along with whatever he says and does, or hedge. New Delhi would be well advised to adopt the latter course. Trump is the kind of person who will insist on always holding the steering wheel and maintain that only he knows the direction; complainers will be asked to get off. In an America First world, pursuing an India First policy is the logical response.
In recent years, India, like many other middle powers like the UK, Germany or Japan, has gotten used to leaning on Uncle Sam who, of course, revelled in the role of global leader. But things have changed and it is time to explore other options. Without much money or military muscle, our India First strategy has to be based on building durable coalitions with like-minded countries without egregiously stepping on American toes.
First, we need to shore up our most vital external area – the Persian Gulf. Obama exempted India from the oil sanctions in 2012. But such accommodation would be out of character in the Trump era, which has just put Iran “on notice” for testing a ballistic missile. Leave alone sanctions, the big worry now is the possibility of a shooting war in the region. Trump has declared that “nothing is off the table”, with regard to Iran.
India will not escape the collateral damage of a war in Iran. It is the fourth largest supplier of oil to India, and any war against Iran will also hit oil supply from our other partners like Saudi Arabia and Iraq. More than oil, a US-Iran standoff will dent our geopolitical plans centred on the port of Chabahar to link up to Afghanistan and Central Asia, as well as the International North South Transportation Corridor (INSTC) connecting India’s west coast ports through a multi-modal network to Europe, via Iran and the Russian railway system. INSTC is India’s humble but important version of China’s One Belt One Road plan.
Second, we need to guard against instability in the Asia Pacific. Steve Bannon, Trump’s chief strategist, said in early 2016 that war with China and Iran were real possibilities. In his confirmation hearings, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson declared that the US would deny access to the seven artificial islands China had constructed in the South China Sea.
India would not be directly affected, and may even revel at China being put in its place, but even a short sharp clash between two of the world’s leading powers will, at a minimum, generate severe turbulence in the global economy which cannot but affect our growth.
What we need is an eastern coalition with Japan, Vietnam, Australia, Indonesia and Singapore to rein in China, but also moderate American adventurism. A western coalition with Russia, Persian Gulf states and Japan should aim to calm things down in the Persian Gulf. Russians have a major stake in INSTC, and oil from the Persian Gulf is vital for Japan.
One country is in both lists, Japan, which has emerged as a major economic partner and aid giver to India. Tokyo is enhancing India’s domestic connectivity and has expressed interest in partnering India in Chabahar and the larger connectivity goals in Iran and Central Asia. Strategic coordination between the two middle-powers of Asia would be a big hedge against the vagaries of America First.
Times of India February 4, 2017